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The  follmting text  attempts to give  an answer to the question of tha  --t~elioa.­
tion of the new  guidelines in the field of the  common  steel policy.  Here  a. 
discussion of the technical details has been deliberately put  aside in favour · 
of a  description of the most  important  elements of the methods to be used. 
On  tho steel market  reversals of trends generally occur so  suddenly that 
' 
most  statistics,  which  in any case only reflect past  occurences,  reveal the 
fluctuations far too late•  Expediting these retrospective statistics on 
incoming orders and  orcter books  give  some  indication of the forward situa-
tion.  It is therefore important to improve  these statistics and  to find 
appropri2~o methods  of interpreting the~  (e~g.  breakdown  of orders into 
normal  seasonal movements  ancl  cyclical components). 
Statistics on  steal production,  steel consumption,  stock ievele,  enployr.1ent·, 
external trade  (exports,  imp.orts)  and  utilization of capacity are all data 
tJ-..,_·~·  -"'  not  generally reveal  changes in cyclical trends until it is too 
late.  T;wse  indicators must  therefore be  estimated in aclvance.  The  estima-
ting methode  used to prepare the forward  progra.mw~s are sui  table for this 
purpose.  The  system of  economic  indicators to be set up  will only provide 
a  genuine early warning system if it can· indicate future developmE',nts. 
In addition to the  above-mentioned statistics, tho actual prices  (in the 
Community  and  for export)  and  some  cost  elements  (ore prices,  scrap prices, 
wage  costs,  energy costs)  should be  added  to the planned system  of economic 
indicators.  As  forward.  estimates are not  feasible here,  a  relia.blo repor-
ting system  should be  introduced-between the,Commiseion  and  the enterpriSes 
which  should be  as  up to date as possible. 
. :· 
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Various macro-economic  indicators can of  course  be.)  a.d.clccl  to these  steel-
specific indicators.  As  soon  as the first  siGTis  of  a  depression appca.r, 
the  econoT'lic  inr_icators in question  should be  collE!Cted  at  least  every 
two  weeks •.  its  soon  as cortain threshold  valu~'s,  1·1hich  will be fixed in 
consul  tat  ion vn th the different  i_n:tc;rosted  groups  including representatives 
of  tho  Governments,  the  Com~Jission should  occupy itself so  rapidly as 
possible '"i th the  state of the steel market  in order that the appropriate 
decisions may  be  taken should the  eccasion arise. 
In the last depression,  the  forw::-.~.rrl  programrne~ na.de  an  important  contri-
bution towards  stabilizing the  steel narkct.  They would  h<.we  been even 
more  effective had  the  clmmswinc been de-tected  a:t  an earlier date  and 
predicted more  accurately.  The  rwthods  usecl  are,  however,  incomplete  and 
outtl1mled  in nany respects,  'l'hc  results of  our  estirnatGs are  therefore 
unsatisfactory  :  in eal'1y 19'75  the start of the depression was  not  detected 
for  a  long time.  futh  the  low  of -the  depressi.on in the  SUIJriler  of  1975  and  the 
recovery early in 1976  Here  grGa.tly underestimatod.  Th.-;  present  poo:r  state 
of  our forecasting methods  make  it essential to better them.  The  relevant 
Cor:nnission depar-tments  have  already star-ted this tas:: vii th the  co-opera-
tion of  several scientific institutes.  Tho  focal points of  these studies 
are  the  improvement  of the forecasting  of future activity in  individual 
sectors of  the fabricating i1'1dustry  (on which the steel industry is of 
course  dependent)  and  the forecasting of  changes  in stock levels. 
This  work will not  be  completed before the  end  of the year  and  consequently 
nothing can as yet  be  said about  the results,  but it shoulcl  prove possible 
to bring the margin  of  error down  again to the much  smaller margin attained 
in the  sixties.  On  the  other hand,  it should  be pointed out that however 
subtile the methods  used it will never be possible conpletely to rule out 
thE·  occurence  of  estimating errors.  Experience  shows that the estimating 
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errors are greatest  when  the  changes  in cyclical trends are the moat  acutoo 
It is therefore essential to provide for the possibility of  subsequent 
corrections to the programncs. 
The  estimates 'l'rill  at first bo  broken down  for each country of the  Commun~~y 
into real conBU.r.1ption,  stock changes,  deliveries  and  receipts from  other 
countries  of the  Comnunity,  import  and  export  from  third countries as well 
as  crude  stool production. 
The  first question is which is the raost  effective forn to give to these 
programr.1es.  The  production of crude  steel is only remotely relaterl to the 
development  of the r.1ark:et.  Thus it is necessary to show  in tho forward pro-
grrumnes  deliveries analysed by the major product  groups  of the  ECSC  Treaty. 
The  forward  progrmnme  will furnish the rato of adaptation of the deliveries 
to the forecast  demand?  these percentages 11ill be  determined by the  COtmlie-
sion by cmmtry ancl  by najor product  group. 
In order that tho  Comr:lission.  can carry out  such calculations each enter-
prise nust  report  to the  Comnission its deliveries by product  within the 
Common  Harkct  an0.  for export to third countries. 
The  percentages for the  oojustmont  of  supply to demand  result from  the 
relationship between the  reported deliveries in a  reference period  and  the 
estimated demand.  They  permit the  Commission  itself to determine the for-
ward  objectives by company.  The  for'(lard  objectives will be  commun~_cated by 
the  Commission directly to  each enterprise. 
The  enterprise  can report  to the  Commission  any difficulties which may 
arise in arriving at this objective·. 
The  Cotm1ission  will follow t-Jith  care.the'observanco of these objectives 
whether determined in tho  above  manner  or  evontually.ae.justed~ 
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:·n  period  of  depresr:::ion  and for con.sider·ations  relative to the  safegu..ar-
,:tine production  and  enployment  the  enterprises can,  if the  ca.o.c  arises, 
;·;reduce  steel for·  their oun  stocks;  those  stocks  can be  sold  vJhen  th3 
·,"r::onor.1ic  condi ti Jns  becor~e more  favou.rnbl·2. 
'i'he  total  syster:  underlines  the  non-restrictive character of  the  engnge-
r;!eut  token  lJ;r  the enterprises  >Ji th the  Conmi ssion  and  the elastioi  ty with 
:-rhich it can  ·be  put  into action under the authority of  the  Cor:rr:\ission. 
·:.overnr::ent  repr8sentatives,  t;he  associ.Cltions  of  the  enterpris~s, the trade 
·-~nio:ns  1  the  consuners  and  merchant<'~ .-;:Lll  l:e  closely associated with the 
J.evelopnent  of the  syster,,  of  aaalysi  s  and  :mrv<ai llMC·c  of'  the market,  the 
ir.1proveiilent  of  the forecnsting methods  and  are  consul  ted  in the  ccureEJ  of 
the prepar;;dion of  the  forward  progra.•nriJ8S. 
The  fixing of mintr.<ur:t  reference prices  ::.  s  envisaged by the  Gonmission  ae 
defined in the  docuoent  (con  (76)  543  final). 
!t :\.s  actually studying the  uode  of  application of  such px·ices.  This must 
especially talce  accou.nt  of  a  certain number  of difficulties,  so:ne  technical, 
some  eoonot:1ic,  related to the  fac·t  that  sales froo  stock and  imports  are 
not  included.  The  clanger  of  complaints concerning  dui:~ping r:mst  be  also 
kept  in mind.  Further it must  be  underlined that the  adjustment  of produc-
tion to  demand  already constitutes an  j_r.1portant  element  of stability a.nd 
indeed for the recovery  of  steel prices. 
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The  grun.ter is tho  success  of tho  for1:1ard  progranne in relation to tho 
stabilizing of prices \vithin tho  Com:1Unity  tho nor-:l  nttractivc it t.rill  bo 
for third country producers to export  to the  Community.  However,  increa-
sing inports coulrl  toncl to unclerr,1ine  the  stabilizing effect  of tho for-
ward  prograta.ucs.  For these  reasons it is necessary to envisage  : 
a  ro,'!Ular  e:x:_chcnge  of  infort:1a:tion 
a  conaulto..tion  anc1.  cooperation process for porioC'..s  of dcpressiono 
vlith  respect  to the  qxchn.ngc  of  information this should  cover not  only 
short·-tem rw.rket  clata but  also  long tern clovolopment  troncla.  Inland dcnand, 
external  trru:1e  ancl.  internal deli  vcri\~S are  above  all counted in the  do~a.in 
·of market  d.ata  and in such cases not  only historical clc.te,  but  also fore-
casts are, included.  'rho  Cor.u:~ission publishes  such infornation regularly 
in its fon·rarc".  progrant:EJs  as  well  o.s  in its Statistical Bulletins.  Through 
the  r:-,~h<?.n~o  of  infor..1ation in particular on  inland demand  and  external 
trade conditions  should be  established whereby all tho participating 
r.~arket  partners can tcl::cn  account  in their export  planning of tho  econor.lic 
development  in tho  receiver countries.  The  data exchange  ~vould be purely 
of  an  inc:ic<:>.ti vc  character. 
In respect  of the  long tern trends tho  evaluation of tho  most  rccr:mt  long 
tern foroc;:-,sts  out  of  USil.  ancl  Japan  ancl  their conparison Hith our  Genore.l 
Objectives for Stool  show that  those estinates incluc1.c  consider<.thle  double 
and triple. countin;g of  one  and  the  sai.1C  r'!.enand,  this aJ;1ounting to at  least 
in total  sor:1e  15  r,Jillion tonncs  of crude  steel:  hlhon  through nutual 
enlightr.ont  of the r.1arlcet  partners  such estina.tos  can be  mndc  more  conpa.-
tiblo a  contribution to the esta.blishnont  of  a  better intoz~ational cqui-
. libr~.un behTCcn the  expansion of capacity .and  the  lon~ term developnent 
of  stool  dcmancl  01:-.n  bo  made. 
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'I'hc  nmwul tat  ion  to.nd  co-opcro.tion,_ process  ca.n  be  set  in motion  at  the 
request  of  0ach n3.rkct  partner wh(m  in periods  of recession  ir:1ports  do  not 
ruljust  to t:r0  d(~c".inint=;  ctr.::cl  dcJ~ru1cl  nne~  <::orious  rlisturba.nccs  of tho  steel 
ua:rkut  ta1::c  plr~c:::c:.  ~.'hn  Com:Ji sr:;ion  1voulcl  i:n  thvGC  cases eli scuss  Hi th the 
govornn mts  of  th8  cocmtries  concornod.  w:i.th  tho  aim  of persuading these 
coun-trios to  b~h.:'l.vc  in  <t  r:1.:=tP..nur  norc fi  ttinrs to the r!larket  concli tions. 
This  proc~ss woult  of  course  be  two-sided,  i.e. it could  not  only be  used 
by  US  ;:vs-e.irc:"t  O·~r ;1arlcot  f'etrtncrs  but  al30 in the  other direction  aca.inst 
tho  Cor.~:;,_w;.ty.  This  prop0r::cx'.  con2ul  t.q,tion  2nd  co-oporc>:tion  proc(;SS  contains 
110  binding·  con•,li tr.JCut;-;  l:ll:._-:;  co:noirrtG  unly  of  volmit:'l.ry colJ n.boration  ancl  is 
restricted to dofi:ni tc porioc1 .s  of  rcoossion. 
The;  above  nancd  r.1cnsurcs  cover countries with  a  liberal  cor.1r71.crcial  policy 
and  Hi thin thiEI it should  bo  poss:i.blo  to restrict  tho.r.1  to tho  most. iDpor--
tont  trnrling partners.  1':r?ong  thoso  countries the  Com~u..11i ty has  a  specially 
closu  rc:J.ntionshi.p  w:i.th  tho  BF'Tll.  countries  ourroundi:nG' it. It rennins to 
be  invcst:i.gatcl'l  1-1hothcr this fnctor  should be  tak:on into  account  in  a 
sui  t.?.l<Lc  L'<-1.nncr •  .:.  sui  table frnr:1ov1or\:  for the proposed  exchange  of  infer-
Dation  nnrl  the consultation  ancl  co-operation process  rcr1ains  to be  esta-
b1is110cl. 
Several  r.w:.1·bcr  st:1tos possess  quanti  tati  vc  import  restrictiont: against the 
stato·  -trnc'liYlg nations.  In  aC'.di tion  a  cor1r.1on  process for  consul  tat  ion, 
control  2.nc'  ..  safe(3"nard  noasuros  exists.  Those  instru-:1onts  offer the possi-
bi F ty of  a  certain protection of th8  CoJil.I'lOn  Market  a&ainst  imports fron 
stdc-·trc=u:l..ing nations. 
The  Gcmcral  Objucti  vt:c  for  stool  give  a  necessary muximur:1  ca.paci ty of 
215  r'lillion tonnes  cruci.c  dc:ol for  1980.  The  la.st  invcstncnt  survey,  hovT-
evcr,  indicates that  r.1axinu.;~1  cr~-pn.ci ty v!ill bo  2·20  nillion tonnes, ·although 
u.bout  228  million tonncs  Here  expected  a  year and  a  half ·ago.  This  shoHB 
that  ilwcstnent plans have  been cut  back in tho  neantime.  As  the threat of 
surplu;>  ce.pacity is therefore greatly reclucoc1..  (only 5 instead of  13  million 
tonncs),  no  further iloasuros to establish a  long-tom balance in the case 
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of crude  steel  should.  be  taken for·· the time  being.  The  remaining rise in 
cap8.ci ty rcr::ults froG  n.  nu;.~bor of  investment projects designed prinarily 
to  rqplo.ce:  vlltda.tod  pla..'1t.  For rco.suns  of'  cor1potitivity thoso p:tojocts 
should  be  carried through.  In tho  case  of heavy sections  end particula.rly 
wire  rod the danger exists of  a  lohg-tcrr.1 capacity surplus.  This was  indi-
catccl in tho  General Objectives.  l\ bettor .llC1.aption  to demand  cnn be  achieved 
above  a11., by the  closure of  old. plants as well as  cor.1I.1on  investments by a 
number. of  cor:1pa.l1ies  ins  tend  of the  carrying out  of too mro1y  eimul  toneous 
investDents~ 
Fran this point of vimv it is dosirablo that  regular discussion  on the 
results of  the  investment  enquiry  shoulcl take place in order to fe.cili tate 
tho  rulo.ptntion of capacity to dor:wnd.  Through  such  a  profound.  exchange  of 
vicus tho  existence of disequilibria can be  avoided. and tho  opinions  of 
the  Cor.u:1ission  on investment notifications ei  von  a  greater weight. 
In addition to tho  acl..aptation  of capacity to clcr,1and the. increase  of produc-
tivity pof.lsosses  a  special  i1:1portancc.  This results from  tho fact  that in 
1975  the  Gormrmi ty steel  industry  sa;.1  a  further C',eclino  in its sh:->,ro  of 
. 
the Horld narkot,  1vhilo  other countricst  especially Japan,  managed  to 
increase their shares.  Japanese  steel exports arc today almost  t-vlice  as 
high the  Coranuni ty'  s  steel exports. 
The  ConDW"li GY  unclcrtakings  covered oy  the  survoy arc constnntly pointing 
out that tho depressed  level of world narket  prices does not  sufficiently 
'  . 
cover their costs.  Ono  of the  reasons is to be  found  in tho  lot·ter producti-
vity in our  steehTOrks. ·our invcstnent  and  credit policy should  tf.croforo 
air.1  to help  o.s  far  as possible to increv.se 'produ.ctivity in the works.  This 
could  also help to alleviate the  consequences  of a  futuro depression.  The 
General Objectives already give this as  a  priority ain in our credit  and 
investment policy. 
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p,  ~' ·s;!i;:}  and  Ree;ional  fElLli~ 
}.».  the  'General  ObjGcti  ves  Steel 1980-1985'  attention 'l!as  drawn to the fact 
-~;ll"t  employment  :i:,:•  ~he  Community  iron and steel industry would  probably 
e~~perience a  cJ  -~'1-I'  reduction in certain areas  through to 198oo  In some 
areas this redctdion  of  employment  could~  as  in the past,  be achieved by 
~.omal vrastage  (rci;irement  and  volunta:·-y resignations).  It is an objective 
of regional  pol icy to provide al  terna.t~  ,re  employment  opportunities  in  such 
ci.rcumstances,  to maintain  economic activities in areas  so  affected. 
!t should be  possible in the larger enterprises to transfer some  of the 
l  )rkers affected by the  closures  or rationalisation measures  to the posts 
.'reed ·oy  such wasta,g'(; ..  In  ord.::J!·  that  such measures  may  be  successful they 
lmJ.st  be  prepared  :in  advance  ..  The  dispersion over time  and tho  vocational 
retraining of the workers  to be tra..11sferred are the essential  condi  tiona 
•)f their success  • 
.  :·~ ..  1  further  employment  with.Ln  a  works  is however not  always  possibleo  This 
.i.s  above all tho  case wh(m  a  complete enterprise or a  works  closes,o  In 
•mch  circumst?..nces  the  impact  on  th'3  local  economy can be  particularly 
.·evere. 
1'he  Commission  has  made  adaptation  nonventions with the affected member 
dtates  in order to facilitate the  p;:trticipatic.n of the worker in courses 
:'or vocational  retraining,  the  ··  'J.king up of lo'lt;er paid employment  and the 
-r;ransfer to a  job at a  distant  location,  or redtlCe  the  impact  of temporary 
unemployment~ 
These  conventions  established in application of Article  56  of the  ECSC 
_,'reaty are modified on  reqo.cst  of the  governments  and normally after dis-
cussion with the  interested paJ~ies to take account  of the  changing social 
(;ondi tions  in the region. 
"n  the basis of these  conventions the  High Authority and the  Commission 
h::we  given  up to the  end  of 1975  credits to the amount  of 237  million UA 
t0 the \)ene:fit  of 449v000  wo"Ck:ers  of which  24,2 million  UA  (10 %)  were 
:lN<tl'dod  to 9  .'~, 000 otool  No:rkor·G, 
·J.'he  share of  --redite destined for the steel works  ie increasing markedly 
~+,  the present  tim~o  In 1975 the adaptation credits for  steel industry 
1.·eached  17 fa  of the toh.l  (3~4 million UA  from  20).,  For 1977  13 million UA 
Clr  52  %·  of the total amount  of 25 million UA  have been  eatima.ted for the vJOrlcers  in the  steel industry and iron ore  Iilines  a  This  amount  based  on 
estimo.tes  by the member  state;s  l3h0i·rs  the Hillingn.ess  of the  Conunissi.or:  to 
provide the nec;essary funds  for steel -vmrkers  in difficulties. 
In those areas  Hhere  the  reduction of employment  in the  steel industry 
cannot  be  <J.Ccomplished oy  changes  of  job,  and by retraining <1lone,  the 
Commission  ~.;ill  gi  vo  priority to facilitating the nec·essary industrial  r8·~ 
structuri11g  on the basis' of Article  56  of the  ECSC  'f're;;..ty Hhereby alter-
na.tive  eruplo;yment  opporttmities  can  be  created,  by :financing investments 
in nev; activi·ties. 
The  Commission1  for. its part  1  v!ill  study Hi th the mem1;er  countrie:.:~  and the 
social partners the  problems  -v.rhich  the steel industry may  be  coDfronte:d 
..-i th in the  domain  of employment  -,-vhethe:r.  at the level  of the steel  industr:r 
in total or of certain steel reeions  t;hich might  be  particularl;;,r by the 
crisj.s. 
To  this  r.:ffect,  at the  j_nitiative of the  CoronJj_ssion,  the Hixed  Comwittee 
'Steel'  ha.s  recently retaken up its activities and has  constituted  s0v<>J.-·al 
i10rlcing g:roups  Hhich have  l)een  charged Hi  th the  eY  .. a.mination  of the  diri'e-· 
rent  so,·\ial  and  regional  aspects  of the steel policy and more  particuJ.arly 
thosn  •·r·~:.ich  could affect the  employmcmt. of the steel workers. 
~~----------------------